ARTICLES

Tocqueville’s Machiavellianism

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Abstract: Tocqueville’s sole reference to Machiavelli in *Democracy in America* is a nicely located misquotation. This article makes much of it, more than one would likely think possible. Tocqueville’s mission was to replace Machiavelli in his role of captain-philosopher and to save the aristocratic element in democracy that Machiavelli believed should be dispensed with.

Keywords: Tocqueville, Machiavelli, Napoleon, aristocracy, war of ideas

On its face the notion that one can learn something about Machiavelli from Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* or about Tocqueville from Machiavelli, may seem, as the English say, “a bit much.” Tocqueville mentions Machiavelli only once toward the end (vol. 2, part 3, chap. 26). There he quotes what he calls a “great truth” from Machiavelli. Yet despite this encomium, he quotes Machiavelli incorrectly. One is tempted to assume that he had only the most superficial knowledge of Machiavelli or interest in him. But wait! That the misquotation is in chapter 26 beckons to any adept of Machiavelli, who knows his devotion to the number 26 (or 13), an alerting signal impossible to ignore. It says that Tocqueville knew Machiavelli quite well and deeply enough that he wished to make clear his respect and his criticism of Machiavelli. That Tocqueville misquotes Machiavelli, himself the very maestro of misquotation, an author who almost never gets one right, one who would despise an unimproved rendition of someone else’s words—does not indicate carelessness but actually confirms that a message between them we are meant to overhear is more, rather than less likely.

According to Tocqueville, “Machiavelli says in his book *The Prince* that ‘it is much more difficult to subjugate a people that has a prince and barons for chiefs than a nation that is led by a prince and slaves.’” The reference, we may presume, is to chapter 4 of *The Prince*. Tocqueville follows Machiavelli when he says next that “in order to offend no one” he interprets “slaves” as public functionaries under the prince. But he departs from him in a more important way. What Machiavelli actually says is that it is difficult to acquire such a state (exemplified by “the state of the Turk”), but having conquered it, one can very easily hold it. Tocqueville, by using the word “subjugate” (*subjuguer*), blurs the distinction between acquiring and holding, and he denies half of the point that Machiavelli argues: that it is difficult to acquire although easy to hold a nation led by a prince and slaves. What might these changes mean?

Tocqueville’s sole reference to Machiavelli occurs at the end of his consideration of the army in democracies, concluding the third part of the second volume of *Democracy in America*. This part considers mores, beginning from the thesis that as conditions are equalized, mores become milder (*s’adoucissent*). It is a thesis that begins mildly, with “mild” as a benefit of democracy, but ends as “mild despotism,” the nemesis of democracy, in part 4 (*DA*, 2.4.6, 662–63).

“The influence of democracy on mores,” the subject of part 3, amounts to a comprehensive examination of the inequalities of human nature and life that democracy must somehow deal with—by democratizing. Democracy democratizes, or manages its inequalities, through the use of associations; so part 3 is about the ways in which human beings associate and why they associate, or about how they achieve common goods. It culminates with a comment on the courage required for “the maintenance and prosperity of the American association” as a whole (*DA*, 2.3.18, 595). Tocqueville’s argument moves from associations that are merely necessary (chaps. 1–4 on democratic citizens and 5–7 on economic associations) to the natural and pleasant (chap. 8 on the family), to those chosen (chaps. 9–14 on marriage and the private), to those grounded as much in human pride as in necessity, or in the human necessity of pride (chaps. 15–26 on national pride and the military). Tocqueville’s thematic reflection on Machiavelli begins in chapter 18 of

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part 3, “On Honor in the United States and in Democratic Societies.”

Tocqueville had reason to focus on Machiavelli’s concern for honor. He also had reason not to argue with him openly. Both were philosophers who shied away from being identified as philosophers because both, in different ways, objected to the prevailing philosophy of their times. In a nutshell, Machiavelli objected that philosophy was too spiritual or otherworldly, Tocqueville that it was too materialistic. Both feared that philosophy had become dogmatic and was giving bad advice to society as well as to other philosophers, and both concluded that the best way to oppose bad philosophy was to show its bad effects rather than to argue openly against its mistaken premises. Machiavelli believed that philosophy needed to turn from intelligible truth to “effectual truth” (*verità effettuale*), whereas Tocqueville, having seen the effects of effectual truth, particularly in regard to honor and pride, promoted a return, in good part, back to otherworldly “spiritualism” as it might be affirmed generally to oppose “materialism” (*right*).

Machiavelli’s view of honor may be approached from his critique of Christianity and the Church in the *Discourses on Livy*. His stated intention at the beginning of the book is to act for “the common good of each one (*ciascuno*),” that is, the good common to each individual man with other individuals, not a collective good either of humanity as a whole or of one of Tocqueville’s associations, a common good not achievable by an individual on his own. This individualizing of the human good is reflected in the motto of his advice, “one’s own arms.” Yet, despite this step toward modern individualism, he retains the classical distinction between the few and the many, though in a new form.

Rather than offering opinions making opposite claims to rule, the few, now called “the great” or “the nobles,” desire to master the rest, and the many, or “the ignobles,” desire not to be mastered. These are called “humors” rather than opinions because they do not suggest an opinion setting forth a common good that could include them both. In fact, the two opposite humors can be united only through the use of fraud, which checks and mollifies the people without allowing them to rule. The people can be satisfied by indulging their hatred of the nobles through devices such as sensational executions and other modes of fraud. The few can be indulged and checked by allowing them to compete for the mastery that they crave over the many and especially among themselves.

Machiavelli believed that mankind is divided into these two humors naturally and universally, and he therefore supposed that his solution was neither democratic nor aristocratic but a new form of mixed regime. But as Tocqueville saw it, the result of Machiavelli’s solution, and of the modern improvements made on it in the seventeenth century by Thomas Hobbes and his successors, was to establish, contrary to Machiavelli’s intention, an increasingly egalitarian democracy that denied the claims and the humor of the few. Machiavelli had thought that his goal of working for the common good of each was mainly opposed in his time by the doctrine of Christianity, which placed the good of the next world over the good of this world, and its hypocritical practice in the Church, furthering the good of the Church in this world while pretending to be above it. Christianity was hostile to “the honor of the world,” meaning *this* world, and the power of the Church, always strong enough to frustrate princes and too weak to replace them, kept honor-seekers in the condition that he memorably called “ambitious idleness” (*ozio ambizioso*). “The honor of the world” was unemployed, one could say, in the “weakness” into which “the present religion has led the world.”

The cause of the world’s weakness is the “profession of good in all regards” that Machiavelli inveighs against in chapter 15 of *The Prince*. Such profession leads men to imagine states—“imaginary republics or principalities”—that are altogether good and thus above this world. These might be imagined either by virtue of reason, such as Plato’s *Republic*, or by revelation, such as St. Augustine’s *City of God*; in both cases, the imagination of an invisible good, an invisible justice, above the visible good or justice of this world. Machiavelli insists, against these possibilities, that politics be kept within the bounds of this world, that it be confined to “worldly things.” These are glory and wealth arising from the acquisition of visible, tangible goods by means of “virtue,” now newly understood as serving human necessity by being devoted to gain, not some invisible purpose above it. The invisible remains but the invisible soul (*anima*) is replaced by animated self-defense (*animo*). Honor is no longer resistance to necessity but now energetic obedience to necessity led by the princely element that out of necessity desires mastery. Machiavelli’s princes displace the honor-lovers of antiquity, who were called “nobles” or “gentlemen” because they rose above the alleged necessity of desire for mastery. An uncorrupt republic, a civil way of life (*vivere civile*), he says viciously, requires that the gentlemen all be killed and an “even equality” established.

Here Tocqueville’s objection to Machiavelli may be discerned. With the destruction of gentlemanly honor, the principle of egalitarian democracy is given entrance, later to develop into the spiritless sort of democratic republicanism Machiavelli did not want. In egalitarian democracy, Machiavelli’s two humors are transformed. The princely element of mastery becomes the centralized rational administration of the Immense Being (*ètre immense*), known today as Big Government and instructed by what Tocqueville calls “the science of despotism”; with aristocracy dispirited if not eliminated as Machiavelli literally recommends, the brisk rivalry of acquisitive princes comes to an end and is replaced by rational control. The popular humor also loses its spiritedness as its desire not to be mastered gives way to a submissive acceptance of the benefits provided by the Immense Being—the new democratic condition, lacking the republican hatred Machiavelli praised, that Tocqueville called “individualism.” Both gentlemen and hatred of gentlemen disappear in rationalized, spiritless, egalitarian democracy.

Machiavelli’s mistake was to surrender the defense of liberty to the satisfaction of worldly necessities. In wishing to dispense with rule by the invisible and to concentrate on the visible, he endangered the free will liberty requires and thereby undermined the very virtue he wanted to support. With his emphasis on the unintelligibility of nature and the malleability of human nature, he opened the way to the
materialism of modern science. For Tocqueville, by contrast, liberty requires the strength and pride of a free soul more easily found in aristocracy than democracy, and his “new political science” consists in bringing democrats to associate so that they can imitate the vigor and responsibility of aristocratic nobles when defending their own liberties. For him, the “honor of the world” can be sustained only by the honor of the other world, because religion accords to “each one” the benefit of a divine soul as opposed to Machiavelli’s license to kill. The awareness of having a soul endorses one’s self-respect and sense of shame, which protect liberty more nobly and yet more surely than the slavish materialistic concern that may lead people to sacrifice their liberty for security. Machiavelli wanted to revive the honor of the world, but he went about it in the wrong way. He thought necessity to be the spur to virtue, but the early history of modern political philosophy after Machiavelli from Hobbes on showed otherwise. If risk can be contained by rational control, there is little or no need for virtue and rigorous necessity can be led by degrees to security and comfort, leaving honor and glory behind.

For Tocqueville, the elevation of honor over worldly necessity is as difficult as it is vital in a democracy. He begins his discussion of democratic honor in chapter 18 of part 3 by avowing that honor is essentially aristocratic. It appears first in aristocratic codes of honor with bizarre particularities, seemingly arbitrary, such as the rules governing duels between feudal nobles. What is honorable might easily “shock the general conscience of the human race,” that is, the democratic instinct to judge by the action and not by the rank of the person. Behind the arbitrary appearance, however, is the solid fact that honor supported the practice of “military courage,” which is the central virtue of a “military aristocracy,” or also of the Roman republic, a singular association that was formed for the conquest of the world. Military courage is hardly appropriate to a nation like America devoted to commerce and industry rather than war, displaying peaceful rather than turbulent and dazzling virtues, and given to mobility rather than keeping in one’s place. Courage is known and esteemed there in commerce on the sea, in suffering the miseries and solitude of the wilderness, and in rebounding from the loss of a fortune—instances of daring and risk-taking necessary to maintain and keep prosperous “the American association.” But for the most part democracy’s egalitarian spirit opposes the inequalities necessary to honor and favors the taste for material enjoyments, which makes one fearful of risk.

When honor is unavailable, ambition is stifled or distorted. In democratic America one finds universal ambition but no great ambition because ambition there is satisfied with petty success. Where inequality is suspect, progress is slow and ambition narrowed. Tocqueville is reminded of a Chinese novel in which the hero finally wins the heart of his mistress by doing well on a civil service exam. So when a rare great ambition does appear, it is violent and revolutionary. Without clearly defined honorable modes to follow and ends to seek, ambition cannot serve the common good via glory. That one cannot construe the uniform and continuous movement toward petty goals as a good for human beings is indicated in Tocqueville’s regret at the modern loss of the “vice” of pride: “Moralists constantly complain that the favorite vice of our period is pride . . . I would willingly trade several of our small virtues for this vice.”

Might a “violent and revolutionary” ambition then serve the common good? Not in modern democracy, according to the argument of chapter 21 on “Why Great Revolutions Will Become Rare.” Contrary to what one might expect from having observed in Europe the turbulent emergence of democracy from aristocracy, and contrary to what one might reasonably assume from the continuous motion and disconnectedness of democratic citizens, democracy’s little motions mask a greater, more fundamental stability. Modern democracy is a society of small property owners utterly opposed to revolutionary passions. Yet there do exist “enterprising and ambitious citizens whose immense desires cannot be satisfied by following the common route.” They will need the aid of “extraordinary events” to bring about the revolutions they love. Tocqueville then turns his argument to one citizen of this sort, “a man, however powerful one supposes him,” who would “only with difficulty make his contemporaries share sentiments and ideas that the sum of their desires and sentiments repels.” So, a man with ideas!

Then, a page later, he applies the notion of revolution by deeds to ideas, speaking of the special difficulty of combating the “singular fixity” of certain principles in America, whether religious, philosophical, moral, or political. Again, he supposes “a man,” one who “comes to conceive in a single stroke a system of ideas very far removed from that which his contemporaries have adopted.” Such an “innovator,” if he presented himself to a democratic people, “would have great trouble in making himself heard, and more still in making himself believed.” Thus it becomes more difficult for an innovator, whoever he may be, to acquire and exercise great power over the mind of a people. Tocqueville repeats the designation of innovator and adds “whoever he may be.” For example, Luther, if he had lived in a century of equality, would not have changed the face of Europe so easily. In modern as contrasted to ancient democracy, people are not swayed by orators or writers. Everyone, being equal in rights, education, and wealth, has similar ideas. If someone differed with public opinion, the dogma of intellectual equality would cause others to distrust him, for the many respect authority rather than argument, and in democracy no individual has authority. The power of the majority is so great that errant individuals sooner doubt their own judgment than the majority’s, and even if individuals came to disbelieve, none dare say so. Indeed, a majority might come to disbelieve yet be intimidated and silenced, each by the public weight of all (a “silent majority”).

Moving from honor to ambition to great ambition to revolution to innovator in ideas, Tocqueville has led us up to the quotation of Machiavelli in chapter 26. With the example of Luther he has brought us to acquiring and exercising great power over the mind of a people, the power of a prophet as Machiavelli would have it, of an unarmed prophet such as Savonarola (a heretic like Luther). In chapter 6 of The Prince Machiavelli introduces the need for a new prince to make people believe him, which is the need to be a prophet, an
armed prophet. Arms are necessary for princes like Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus because it is easy to persuade a people but difficult to keep them in that persuasion. Once they can do this with force and virtue, having eliminated envious rivals, they will be venerated and secure. Machiavelli gives the further example of Hiero, the prince of Syracuse who built everything on his own foundation, so that “he went through a great deal of trouble to acquire, and little to maintain.”

Here is the contrast between acquiring and maintaining that was in the passage from chapter 4 of The Prince, the contrast that Tocqueville omitted in his misquotation. That contrast is now applied by Machiavelli in chapter 6 to the need for a prince to be a prophet, in Tocqueville’s terms to bring a revolution in ideas. Tocqueville is saying in part 3, chapter 21, that it is difficult for that kind of prince (e.g., Luther) to “acquire” a democracy of slaves. He had said earlier that in centuries of equality the common opinion “will become a sort of religion whose prophet will be the majority.” Yet how can the majority be held responsible for democratic beliefs, because it is comprised of individuals who do their best to avoid making judgments? Certainly, opinions in a democracy will accord with the sentiments and interests of the people, but under aristocracy the people have held quite different opinions, accepting poverty as their fate, for example. What brought that change? Circumstances change but circumstances do not necessarily change opinions. What—or who—was the cause of democracy? Maintaining a democracy despite its tendency to extend itself into individualism may then be tantamount to acquiring democracy.

There was reason for Machiavelli to overcome the distinction between acquiring and maintaining and for Tocqueville to blur it. Machiavelli is a philosopher who keeps the role of philosophy in obscurity because he has a new, active role for it—to secure “the world” and to safeguard “the honor of the world.” To do this he would remove the other world from its place hovering over this world and subordinate it as religion useful to this world. As philosopher he was a kind of prophet both unarmed and armed. He was unarmed because he could not be a prince himself; he could only advise princes. But he was armed because he relied on his own arms by taking up the arms of his enemy, Christianity and the Church, and using them against it. The principal arm he seized from it (though not the only one) was propaganda, the Christian mode of not addressing philosophers but spreading the word to non-philosophers, both princes and the people. By advising princes he would reform the moral life of the people. He would lead a conspiracy and as master conspirator he would hold sway over the princes he appeared only to advise. Machiavelli the master conspirator will acquire the world as a prince over slaves, in imitation of the unarmed prophet that he never names in The Prince (but see D, 3.1.4). But he will hold the world through the princes whom he advises, like the French king with his barons, sometimes allowing them to rule or master their peoples, sometimes letting them be beaten down without blame for him—and accepting for himself the role and reputation of Old Nick, the man behind it all.

Tocqueville saw this, as may be inferred from his use of Machiavelli’s code number and confirmed (so far as it can be) in the discussion so far. Claiming for himself a role similar to Machiavelli’s, and like Machiavelli deprecating the need for philosophy, he saw that Machiavelli’s plan for reviving the honor of the world had failed. Instead of giving aristocracy new life, Machiavelli had destroyed it with his formula of ferocity and cunning, lion and fox.

Without nobility his princes would end up serving the people’s demand for security and comfort; the reliance on necessity that he preached would bring not a new virtue but a new degeneration. The moral goodness and martial spirit of the people that he tried to promote would be transformed through the routinization of economics into the democratic taste for material enjoyments. Contrary to his intention, Machiavelli was the true founder of modern democracy. With this insight, as we interpret it, Tocqueville set himself the task of opposing Old Nick by replacing him. Is it wrong to suppose so great an ambition in one man? Tocqueville himself, in rehearsing the argument against censorship, refers to the “power of thought in . . . the word of one powerful man.” He adds, to strengthen his comparison of material and immaterial power, and with nice misdirection, “Will you count writers like soldiers in an army?” He too would be a prince above the princes but would be so in the name of the people; he would not directly challenge the principle of democracy, the sovereignty of the people. He would not be in Machiavelli’s position, having the need to act like a prince over slaves, acquiring the world by changing its principle of authority. Hence in his misquotation of Machiavelli he denies the need to kill the prince whose principality he attacks. In his situation he will without difficulty accept the democratic principle as an “irresistible fact” but he will supplement it with Christianity, in a version that saves a place for honor and pride, to be found in the principle of aristocracy that has been democratized in America. In sum, he combines democracy, Christianity, and ancient nobility in a whole. This combination remains democratic overall. It is not a synthesis that transcends democracy and aristocracy, not a mixed regime of the sort that Tocqueville regards as a chimera. It is a partisan whole under a mind, Tocqueville’s, that strives to see God’s mind from above democracy as well as within it.

To understand Tocqueville’s task and mode of operation, one must see how he develops the notion of a revolution in ideas. Chapter 21 on revolution is followed by five chapters on war, ending in chapter 26, in which Tocqueville discusses democratic armies. In Machiavelli’s prescription a prince does not have his own arms unless he has his own army, and for the unarmed prince, who does not actually carry his own arms, Machiavelli offers the example of Christianity, whose army is the Church militant, and with which he can implement his strategy of imitating his enemy. If Tocqueville is a prince like Machiavelli, he must have his army, an army of readers to carry out his anti-Machiavellian strategy for maintaining democracy.

It is true that democratic peoples, with their love of security and comfort, their disposition to pity, and their cold mercantile reasoning, do not like war—and Tocqueville begins from that fact. But however pacific they may be, democracies must
have armies because no nation can afford to neglect the possibility of war, and “its armies always exercise a very great influence on its fate.”27 This being so, the instincts of the officers and men who constitute them must be understood. The career officer in a democratic army is a special kind of man; his peculiar place detaches him from civil life and makes the army his genuine native country. But he shares with the democratic citizen a disquiet of heart, a taste for pleasure, and a certain ambition. Because democratic countries so dislike war, the best men do not remain in the army, and career officers tend to be disreputable misfits with no sense of honor except the “wounded pride” that gives the soldier a “taste for war” and a “love of revolution.”28 Nonetheless, like that of the Chinese civil servant, the officer’s ambition is gradually tamed by the slow process of advancement in peacetime, and finally he settles into seniority and becomes as unwarlike as a democratic people. It is the youthful non-commissioned officer, always unsure of his place, who has a desperate ambition. Watch out for him! But perhaps Tocqueville can turn him to the purpose of his campaign.

In the last chapter this part of Democracy in America (our chapter 26), Tocqueville expresses his doubt that a democratic nation will ever go to war or that its wars will provide opportunity for anything extraordinary. In vain will princes arm themselves in anger and ambition; in the climate of democratic apathy their swords will fall from their hands. Should democracies still come to war, it will be won by the largest army, not by the most virtuous soldiers or prudent captain. The defeated nation, with its army helpless and its capital taken by the enemy, will quickly surrender because its citizens care less for defending their political authority than for preserving their property. Civil wars, too, will be short and rare, for the party heading and speaking for the majority will easily triumph. Revolutions will give way to coups. Only if the army is divided will there be a civil war, and it will be brief. One side will win quickly solely with the demonstration of its power or by its first victory; or it will fail and be destroyed. “[A]s soon as one can advance ahead freely, one rushes to the capital in order to finish the war in a single stroke.” Insofar as democracies will still have wars or revolutions out of necessity or someone’s extraordinary ambition, they will be inglorious, prosaic, even contemptible.

In describing how modern conquests are made, Tocqueville credits Napoleon with the modern method of conquering by taking capital after capital. Napoleon was the first to use the method but was only said to have invented it: “One is permitted to believe that if this extraordinary man had been born three hundred years ago, he would not have reaped the same fruits from his method, or rather he would have had another method.” Elsewhere in the book Tocqueville tells us that a capital is a center of human intelligence.29 Three hundred years before Napoleon was the time of Machiavelli as well as Luther. At that time one would not have known the method invented by Machiavelli of successfully conquering the world by winning over to his cause intellectuals who would complete his plan for him.30 Tocqueville had earlier spoken of “the greatest captain of modern times” without naming him, who said that the first condition for conducting war is to be young. He seems to be referring to Napoleon, but it is easier to find this prescription in Machiavelli than in Napoleon.31

If Machiavelli can be credited with having conducted a conspiracy through writing, if he can be held ultimately responsible for indicating the shape the modern world ought to take, his difficult acquisition took centuries. In Democracy in America Tocqueville speaks in terms of aristocratic and democratic “centuries.” Machiavelli urged the prince to prepare for war “when he was on campaign with his friends” by reasoning with them. Tocqueville too has an army of listeners and talkers, for in characterizing the discipline of democratic and all other successful armies in chapter 25 he remarks: “The soldiers speak constantly and very freely to their generals, and the latter listen carefully to the discourse of their soldiers and respond to it.” In this place he incorrectly names Plutarch’s great work as The Lives of the Great Captains.32

In the following chapter (chap. 26) Tocqueville misquotes Machiavelli in such manner as to suggest that it is easy to acquire the modern world, just as Machiavelli acquired, or appropriated ancient and Christian sources according to his needs. From Machiavelli, who unwittingly changed the nations of Christendom ruled by kings and barons into modern democracies ruled by princes and slaves, Tocqueville has learned how to reacquire the world. He will use a coup de main within the established government rather than a “regular war” against democracy that is sure to lose. In the fourth and final part of Democracy in America he will explain to his impatient readers how those who want “to create or secure the independence and dignity of those like themselves” can help to attain the “kind of greatness and happiness” proper to them.33

NOTES

1. This essay is based on an unpublished text found in my late wife Delia Winthrop’s (1945–2006) papers. I have changed it enough to be able to claim and accept joint responsibility and thus add to the published work on Tocqueville that we did together.

2. For the number 26, see Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glenco, IL: The Free Press, 1958), 49. For another significant 26th chapter, see Tocqueville’s contemporary, the American historian William H. Prescott, The Conquest of Mexico, book 4, chap. 3, and footnotes.


4. Machiavelli says that the servi (which may be translated as slaves or servants, as in “the servants who as ministers help govern the kingdom”) but then changes the designation to stiavi (slaves) on the next page; see Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. H. Mansfield, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), chap. 4, 17–18. Tocqueville simply says slaves (esclaves) as opposed to servants (serviteurs), discussed in DA, 2.3.5.

5. In the “rubbish” of this passage, consisting of notes and first formulations that Tocqueville chose not to print, he states Machiavelli’s distinction correctly. Also his statements that The Prince is a “horrible work” and Machiavelli a “superficial man” are suppressed in the book, while the book’s praise of a “great truth” does not occur in the notes. The book is more favorable to Machiavelli and omits the moral criticism of the notes. His difference with Machiavelli, we shall see, concerns the value of aristocracy. See Eduardo Nolla and James Schleifer, eds. Democracy in America, bilingual ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2010), 4: 1182–3.
7. *Discourses*, I, pp. 2; 2.2.2.
10. Tocqueville, *DA*, 2.2.2; 2.4.3, 644; 2.4.4, 650.
11. Note this sentence on the Roman republic in which Machiavelli identifies honor and necessity: “In ordering a republic there is need to think of the more honorable part and to order it so that if indeed necessity brings it to expand, it can conserve what it has seized.” *D*, 1.6.4.
12. Here is a singularly Machiavellian description of the Roman republic. See Machiavelli, *D*, 1.6; 2.2–6.
15. *DA*, 2.3.21, 610.
16. *DA*, 2.3.21, 613.
20. In *DA*, 2.1.1, 403–7, “On the Philosophical Method of the Americans,” Tocqueville does not mention Machiavelli among the “reformers” from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century who were indirectly founders of modern democracy. They could not advocate democracy in their still aristocratic time, but they promoted democracy by undermining the authority of religion with advocacy of the authority of individual reason. Among them Descartes is cited amusingly as America’s unread philosopher; Luther is the only name mentioned from the sixteenth century (as in *DA*, 2.3.21, where he appears as an “innovator” in ideas). By citing individual reformers Tocqueville supplies the lack he sees in “democratic historians,” who give only “great, general causes” to particular facts; *DA*, 2.1.20, 469.
21. In the letter to Royer-Collard of 24 September 1836, Tocqueville remarks: “...one feels that Machiavelli, like many people of our day, is gifted with a nature so flexible and so free of all principles, that he would be capable of doing anything, even the good, if the thing became profitable.” (Italics in original)
22. *DA*, 1.2.3, 173.
23. For this phrase see Machiavelli, *D*, 1.20. Machiavelli cites “the Turk” as an example of a prince over slaves, then compares the Turk to Darius, whom Alexander had to attack, and then compares the government of the Turk to the Christian pontificate; *P*, 4.19. Machiavelli himself as a prince attacking the pope is like Alexander attacking Darius. His principality is like the Christian pontificate, neither new nor hereditary but both—new in his inspiration and hereditary in inspiring existing princes with his doctrine.
25. *DA*, 2.4.8, 675.
27. *DA*, 2.3.22, 618.
29. *DA*, 1.2.3, 176.
30. The phrase “in a single stroke” (*d’un seul coup*)—and coup de main is used to describe the coming alternative to revolution—is Machiavellian (he says *ad uno tratto*); so is the word “extraordinary.”
31. *DA*, 2.3.24, 627; Machiavelli, *P*, 25; *D*, 1.60. Cf. Tocqueville’s citations of Pascal: the “extraordinary efforts” that caused him to die of old age before he was forty, and his words on the great advantage of youth when one has “an ambition for great things.” *DA*, 2.1.10, 436; 2.3.19, 601.
32. *DA*, 2.3.25, 630. Tocqueville mentions Alexander on this page, a conqueror of significant interest to Machiavelli, particularly in regard to the distinction Tocqueville seizes upon in *P*, 4; cf. *D*, 1.1.5; Harvey C. Mansfield, *Machiavelli’s New Modes and Orders* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 32n12.
33. *DA*, 2.3.26, 635; 2.4.7, 666; 2.4.8, 675.